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ABSTRACT 
Much has been said in recent years regardinq the transitioning of new results from the research 
laboratory to operating practice, a step of key importance in the acquisition of new technology. 
However, relatively little has been said concerning the steady state requirements necessary to sustain 
a timely flow of new results. It is the purpose of this talk to outline several features that are 
necessary to ensure a continuing transition. 
After that elusive title, I think it's import-
ant to tell you that,when Don Thompson contacted 
me about coming to this meeting,he basically said 
to say what's on my mind, and that's essentially 
what you're going to hear. I '11 certainly weave 
in that theme and I hope that it sets the stage 
for the papers that follow and the Poster Session. 
Today I'd like to talk briefly about the 
place of quantitative NDE in the materials reli-
ability or life management process as a Key 
element to decision-making, and I'd also like to 
suggest how research and its useful pruduct, 
technology, enters the realm of practical applica-
tion as part of that decision-making process. 
My premises are these: firs4 th~t today's complex 
problems, such as systems reliability and life 
management, can be solved when the decision-
making system is understood, is functional, and 
has been validated. My second premise is that 
useful technology transitions because the user 
wants it and because it is easy to use. The 
third point; that a coherent research base is 
necessarily a continuing part of the process, 
but maintains its vitality by being an integral 
part of a system which solves problems. Now 
those are the premises I will touch on at the 
end of what I have to say this morning. I could 
stop there, but really would like to tell you a 
story. 
In the summer of 1967 at Hill Air Force Base 
in Utah, a Minuteman missile was disassembled 
that had been in the silo for seven years, and 
underwent a periodic inspection--x-ray, ultra-
sonic, etc. A technician removed the igniter 
from the front port of the first stage, looked 
inside with a hand-held mirror, and discovered 
some cracks about an inch and a half long in 
each one of the star valleys in that grain design. 
These cracks were located in a position difficult 
to see and easily missed by x-ray. They were, 
however, quite predictable in their location by 
looking at the stress analysis. The existence 
of real, field-generated defects led to a 
momentary paralysis of the system which was 
designed to anticipate and react to just such 
a problem. The planning for the occurrence 
had been elaborate. (I had been part of that 
planning.) It was based on generalities and 
abstractions, and it was tied to a le~l of 
understanding that was, unfortunately, over 
ten years old. The following questions were 
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immediately generated: How serious was a crack 
in that location; is it critical? Can the size 
and location be assessed for an OK or not-OK 
decision? If it's currently OK, will it grow 
to a critical size? How many of the missiles 
in the thousand-missile force were so affected? 
How may the force be conveniently and quickly 
inspected when the missiles are out in the silos? 
How can a conclusive demonstration of an OK or 
not-OK condition be conducted, and at what cost? 
Finally, why weren't we ready for this? 
These and .any other questions couldn't be 
answered with the data and methods we had at the 
time--we couldn't answer the specific question, 
for instance, of how does a crack, which is 
burning, behave? Does the combination pressurize 
inside the crack and mechanically force it open 
so that it splits like a watermelon? Or, does it 
burn the tip of the crack and blunt it, and 
therefore just burn normally to the case, being 
quite predictable through the burning rate laws? 
We couldn't figure out how to inspect the missile 
in the silo for this condition. The cost of 
opening up the silo at that time was around 
$25,000 and disassembly was another $20,000. 
We couldn't even do a decent cost estimate. 
A massive, highly technical and complex program 
was undertaken to get answers to these questions. 
I selected this example because I believe 
it's somewhat foreign in specific content to most 
of the audience in this session, and thereby might 
orovide some stimulation. I also selected it 
because I was part of the techni ca 1 community 
which had formed some ten years earlier to create 
a resurgent technology base in the highly complex 
area of solid rucket structure integrity. We had 
garnered the resources and had established a 
research center or two with long-range ambitions. 
We had spread programs throughout the nation in 
universities and research institutes to work a 
number of intriguing problems, sustained the program 
for nearly ten years, and met at least annually 
to exchange information. 14e found that (with a 
real need for answers in a situation which could 
have been predicted) to get the answers we had to 
generate a whole new set of oriented and integrated 
programs. Now you may see a parallel with this 
particular community. 
I have a personal conviction and determina-
tion not to let that happen to me again if I can 
help it. I'm not saying that nothing of value 
had been produced in the technology programs in 
the previous years, but the key element which has 
stayed with me through the years is the realiza-
tion that a lot of scattered work on obvious pieces 
of a per.ceived general need are of little val ue 
without integration into a workable decision-
making system. I almost feel "like saying that 
again, because it sticks in my mind. A second 
or subordinate realization which should have 
been obvious, and I sti 11 don't know why it 
wasn't, was that our early program thinking should 
have presupposed the occurrence of defects and we 
should have asked the questions: How critical? 
How to measure? How to decide? It wasn't that 
those questions hadn't been asked, it's just that 
they hadn't really been worked conscientiously 
as though they were related to real problems. 
I'd like to generalize a moment and look at 
Fig. 1. I've grown fond of this slide because 
I spent a lot of time trying to simplify the 
structural design process in which the elements 
are described, and the information flow is directed 
toward reaching a conclusion; i.e., a structural 
safety margin. This flow chart was developed in 
concert with a lot of design engineers. I wanted 
to understand the fundamental elements of the 
design process and relate them to structural 
failure. It ought to be obvious, but what we have 
attempted to do is have, as a central idea, the 
analysis--a stress analysis. We're interested in 
how loads are converted into stresses, taking into 
account the geometry and the material properties. 
Material properties here have been split simply 
into "response" and "limit"--for example, the 
ultimate properties. There are generally small 
deformation properties such as modulus, some sort 
of fracture property, or an ultimate stress. 
The stress analysis provides a distribution of 
stresses and strains in the particular object 
and when one compares the output with a failure 
criterion that says if you exceed this value you 
get failure and if you stay within this value 
you don't, it includes, of course, all of the 
probabilistic qualifications and concern with 
statistical distributions of properties. A major 
job of the designer is to conduct a strength 
analysis and come up with a margin of safety. 
Figure 1. 
MATERIALS STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY 
SYSTEM 
Schematic representation of Materials 
Structural Reliability System. 
When one assumes pre-existing defects, an 
analytical predictive process may be used if a 
quantitative characterization of the defect is 
available . Such an analysis is generally based on 
the idea that whatever flaws are present are very 
small and are quite reproducible; therefore, we 
don't even pay any attention to them. Let me get 
into the fracture analysis realm where, assuming 
defects are there, we are concerned with the char-
acterization of those defects. By this I mean 
knowing where the flaw is, how big it is, how it is 
oriented, and examining how it interrelates with 
the stress field. We are then able to deal with 
the question,--under geometrical. load, and environ-
mental conditions--"Will the crack grow?" Will it 
grow to an unacceptable limit? 
This particular conceptual overview of the 
design process, integrating the existence of defects, 
has some new terms, or has some terms that I still 
have to describe . These terms essentially form 
the basis upon which the Minuteman service life 
analysis is now conducted and has been conducted 
for the last ten years. Actually, it took about 
two years to react to the defect problem and this 
conception was the sort of thing which eventually 
popped out of that reaction. 
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Let me breathe a little life into this story 
by describing some of these terms and then I '11 
come back to the concl usions. Fi gure 2 shows 
that the first thing necessary is to define the 
loads. Loads are hard to define, especially in 
a dynamic environment. Missiles are handled a 
lot. They go in and out of silos, they get 
inspected, and then they are used . A motor fires 
for about a minute, so it's used in a severe 
environment for only about a minute, but it sees 
a lot of time sitting around with its own body 
forces acting, usually vertical ly in the silo. 
Determining loads and, as we like to say, stresses 
which must be calculated from the loads is the 
initial problem. The concept of a structural test 
vehicle is to define the load and to validate 
analysis is a rather important concept. 
Figure 2. Definition of loads. 
This, by the way, is a fair drawing of what 
the Minuteman first stage looks 1 ike. As many of 
you know, the grain is contoured down the center 
perforation to get a certain burning profile 
and a certain pressure-time behavior and, thereby, 
the thrust-time behavior. It has four nozzles, and 
you can see the immensity of the problem of trying 
to inspect for a crack which is up in this region, 
radi a 11 y outward from OIJe the the star va 11 eys, and 
thirty feet up the port, since you can 't get access 
to the front end. Its standing vertitilly and there 
are four nozzles on the base, which requires two 
right-angle turns to get an inspection device up 
in there. Coming up with a nondestructive device 
that would extend up and look down the valley 
in the front end was almost impossible. But that 
was only the first challenge; to see how one 
could inspect in the silo from the inside. I won't 
dwell on this much more, other than to say that the 
definition of loads is one element and in Fig. 3 
you get yet another element on the chart, that 
is, the concept of "over-test." I find quite 
frequently, in serving on panels that try to assess 
the viability of a system, that if one projects 
that things are getting serious and thit we really 
ought to take these things out of the field and 
put new ones in, the question always asked is, 
"Have you ever failed one?" Usually the answer 
is no. Thus, the idea of defining a limit test. 
This is kind of a healthy empirical approach to 
1 i fe. Defining a fa i1 ure mode by purposely breaking 
something with a somewhat exaggerated, but realistic 
load is an important part of the process. It's 
fairly expensive, but this is the sort of thi nq 
one does. One puroosely breaks the motor by such 
techniques as plugging the nozzle and pressurizing 
with inert gas. The intention here is to simulate 
the loadinq environment which takes pliee on 
ignition, which is one of the more important loading 
environments. 
Figure 3. Schemati c for "over-test" 1rrangement. 
Figure 4 gets into material properties. The 
great concern in this type of ~ys tern. is to ~ke 
sure that the material propert1es wh1ch one lnte-
grates into that decision-making process are real. 
What we see here i s a cutter tllat was designed to 
set the rocket motor on top of it and bore a hole 
in the side to go in there and extract samples as 
in-situ properties. In fact, you can get the 
gradient properties going from the case of the 
rocket in through to the port. Cutting propellant 
is kind of a dangerous thing, but cutting samples 
out and running the norma 1 cha racteri Ziti on test 
to get the material properties, for bo~ response 
and failure, is an important part of tins process. 
Figure 4. Cutter arrangement for determination of 
materia 1 properties. 
In order to validate the analysis and to get 
some statistical data, some sort of smaller test 
object needs to be created. Figure 5 shows an 
analog motor. It is essentially a small cylinder 
containing propellant with a certain kind of notch. 
One can then have a predictable corner condition, 
do some calculations, and then break the motor, 
the point being that you can break lots of these 
so that you can get some sort of statistical data 
base. Figure 6 shows how one attempts to reproduce 
the particular stress field, the corner condition 
which one might find in a motor, and conduct the 
same kind of stress analysis of this condition that 
one does in the motor. Then by performing the 
transformation one can conclude that, under the 
loading conditions and with these particular 
materials, one can predict the growth of the flaw. 
AULOGUE MOTOR 
Figure 5. Analog motor for the operation of data 
base. 
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Figure 6. Model for reproduction of corner stress 
condition. 
Figure 7 shows an elaborate test used to get 
the failure criterion. Shown is a sort of plane 
specimen, a cross-section in whi ch we are applyi~g 
biaxial loading which is the thermal stress condl-
tion pulling on the outside. There is a thermal 
mismatch between the propellant and the case . When 
the temperature changes what you get is a tendency 
when the temperature is low for the propellant to 
pull away from the wa 11 to which it is bonded.. . 
What sets up is essentially a hoop stress cond1t1on 
around the centerport . Figure 8 shows the conse-
quences of that condition; you grow a crack . These 
are the sorts of tests one runs to validate analy-
ses, but you see, analysis was central to that f~ow 
diagram and one of the proble.s we had was that 1t 
is too easy to believe in analysis once it's com-
pleted. 
Figure 7. Model test for det~rmination of failure 
criterion. 
Figure 8. Same as Fig. 7. Note crack growth. 
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Figure 9 shows what is an unfortunate combina-
tion of things. What it essentially says is that 
one fiAds, from overtesting to the various loading 
conditions, the kinds of fa ilures which can take 
place. The thing that's unfortunate is that it 
doesn't indicate what the consequences of cracking 
might be. The consequences of cracking might be 
burning to the case wall if there is a crack there, 
or fire getting in and burning perhaps too large 
an area thus creating over-pressurization. Certain 
failure criteria based on the continuu1 mechanics 
approach to life haJ been reasonably ~11 established. 
Unfortuna tely, this did not include a fracture 
mechanics approach which was so necessary. 
REPLACEMENT CRITERIA 
Figure 9. Replacement criteria from "over-test" 
results . 
Next, I'd like to get back to my initial 
thougl1ts. My purpose in running through these 
exa~ples is to show that tnere i s nothing mys-
terious about an organized program integration 
and to show how to introduce the analysis and exper-
iment when a problem is to be solved. I guess the 
last thing I want to tell you about Fig. 1 is 
that somehow I've come out of the experience with 
the belief that it's alright to naively push 
ahead. Perhaps not naively, because I think that 
11e sell our institution a little snort. We push 
anead doing the best we can in each elelll!nt of a 
process which will lead to a real decision, taking 
into account what are tile most likely causes o f 
failure. I also think, in retrospect, that this 
is all so obvious, but for some reason we ran a 
program for ten years without all those obvious 
t11ings becoming apparent and without our doing 
much more than making compromises on what would 
be rea 1 is tic tests and rea 1 is ti c prob 1 e115 because 
they cost too much. Each piece of tne tecnnology 
underlying researcn nas a place in tile scheme of 
tnings and has a vital role in the fina l decisions 
and solutions of these problems. 
1low to 1110ve into the technology t ransition 
subject whic~ is shown in Fi g. 10 . The ~oint I 
want to empt1asize here is that this is a kind of 
technology flow chart. (I meant to write that word 
"need" a littl e bigger.) This fl01~ is driven by 
need. It's nice to have something driven by 
opportunity, but if you really want to get some 
acceleration it ougnt to be driven by need. Tne 
point I want to emphasize here i s the coherence 
in the upper-left corner; the cohe rent research 
and techno logy base. I don't know how to get t hat 
point across other than to say that I think in 
terms of the previous chart . I think in terms of 
the pieces of the prob 1 em. I think in tenns of 
the interfaces and making sure that those inter-
faces really represent tne flow of analytical 
information, i.e. that tney represent tile flow of 
numbers wi1i ch are useful in an input/output sense. 
That coherent research and technology base essen-
tially takes the previous sys tern apart and asks 
the question, "Which are the defective elements in 
this system that produced a useless answer?", or 
"Is the system all there?" If I view Fig . 10 as a 
decision-making machine, then, if all the elements 
are there, I can turn the crank and an answer will 
come out. Tne answer might be poor, but at least 
tne machine works. If I've established that basis 
and then moved back to ask in a kind of sensitivity 
analysis approach--which of tile elements is mos t 
defective and is fouling up my answer ~st--then 
I'm prepared to de a 1 with that framework as a con-
stant, as an invariant. I can then deal with the 
elements in an upgrading fashio n, perform a sen-
sitivity analysis which isolates those elements 
which are most deficient, and concentrate re-
sources there. That's essentially the picture. 
The picture shows that new knowledge is required 
and that it's coherent in the sense that you know 
what to do with the knowledge in terms of t ne tinal 
decision. 
.• 
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Figure 10. Elements of Technology Transition for 
NDE. Need is an important driver . 
If you've ewl ved the concept, conduc ted a 
feasibility demonstration, and done the system 
integration, you get into an e l ement here which we 
have sort of taken as a new focus in our applica-
tions program in NDE, that is, the problem of tran-
s itioning to the field in a rea l way throug11 field 
trials. We general l y stop too soon with our pro-
grams. In our typical program we demonstrated 
tne concept, made a few prototypes, tnen gave them 
to people and said, "Go to it." The real tning t o 
do is to get these prototypes out tnere , get them 
used, and then deal with what are i mportant re l ia-
bi 1 ity prob 1 ems. 
New devices are unreliable primarily 
because there are a lot of complicated electronics 
in some things. 14hat we find out, unfortunately, 
is that the reliability of the devi ce is, for quite 
a while, much worse than the reliability of the 
thing we are inspecting. Then, what drives it 
into widespread use? If we specify that people 
must use this integrated systems approach, then 
they need to be brought into the thing in a 
cultural sense. That is, people are general l y 
suspicious of the new, are sure that it's going 
to give them trouble, don't know how to use it 
and aren't sure they want to . 
While I have drawn this "deficiencies and 
additional requirements " line back toward the 
start, it would reall y be legitimate to draw a 
line to almost any stage in this process because 
deficiencies exist in all stages . I think, since 
in this meeting ~e are talking abou t that 
coherent research and technology base, tha t the 
continual input of what the real problems are and 
what the real deficiencies are, based on that kind 
of systems picture, is what is necessary so that 
you know you are a part of something which i s 
pr oducing a real and valuable answer. 
I'd like to get into that specific embarassing 
example of where we didn't do this job well, just 
as a final point. Figure 11 is a picture of some 
people using a Roto-Scanner. Its purpose is to 
detect and define the defects; cracks underneath 
installed fasteners in the wing. Some of you are 
familiar with the problem, and maybe with the 
device . We developed the device through Boeing 
and it did a decent job, at least in our early 
indications. It would detect a 30 mil radial crack 
coming out from a fastener while the fastener is 
installed under one layer. Figure 12 shows the 
various kinds of readout procedures on the oscillo-
scope. The upper right, where one gets essentially 
a circumferential plot of the signal coming back 
from around that fastener, one gets a little notch 
in that plot when there is a defect there. We made 
a prototype and then, with the help of some other 
agencies like the C-5 and a particular rel iability 
and naintainauility program office at Wright-
Patterson (PRAH), four or five of these were made, 
re-engineered to a degree, and given to the inspec-
tion centers. Their assessnent of it is shown in 
lower left. It's pretty good in principle, but it 
has some serious shortcomings in terms of operation 
in the field environment. The guide system for the 
head is unreliable; it kept losing the index and 
then didn't know where the defect was once you got 
an indication. The transducer mounting plate had 
problems which concerned the angles of the trans-
ducer and the particular thickness of the layer 
being inspected. Since the thicknesses varied, 
there were some problems involving moving that 
mounting plate around. There are some problems 
in the electronics. I won't go into them greatly, 
except to say that this was not the best el ectronic 
system for this device. I guess one thing we 
could say as technologists is, "We stop there and 
it's your problem from here on out." The people 
who have to use these things see these problems 
as, ''Gee whiz, you've got to ho 1 d 1t up with your 
left hand and look under your armpit and flip the 
knob." There are some human engineering aspects 
as well as some electronic aspects to the problem 
of dealing with the next step. That's what we're 
asking the people to do, take one more step. Try 
to get out there and make the user a part of the 
process that evolves the re-engineered design. 
Then, once feasibility has been demonstrated, one 
can get into usability, and if those people were 
part of that process then they own it and are 
more willing to transition it. Enough on that 
point. 
Figure 11. Ultrasonic examination with Rota-
Scanner. 
ULTRASONIC SCANNER SYSTEM 
OUTER LAYER- FASTENER INSTALLED 
~- a 
lr.r r~ l~ 
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• SOOO N PftltCAE 
e SHORTIXIMI<GS N F(LD 
t IWIO TO AGJU$1 
• IWIO 1ft aN IIIII 
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Figure 12 . Test results from Roto-Scanner. 
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I'd like to go back to Fig. 10 on the 
"Elerents of Technology Transition for NDE" again 
to enphasize my starting points and conclude my 
remarks. If we're going to maintain this coherent 
research technology base as a kind of continual 
source to pump the sys tern which is driven by need, 
I think it's criti cal ly import ant , of course , that 
the resources be maintained. The resources to 
continually support a generalized subject are hard 
to come by. Therefore, I think the future vitality 
of this particular kind of activity--not from the 
standpoint of having meetings, but f rom the stand-
point of maintaining the momentum and the coher-
ence which has been built up--has a lot to do with 
constantly injecting this particular arrow , the 
feedback from the real problems or needs. Also, I 
think the rump session which Don Forney held the 
other night with several of you on the C-5 problem, 
in which researchers from various institutions 
were brought together and brainstormed a real 
problem, is the greatest way to do that. So, I'd 
advocate a couple of thi ngs for the future for, 
at least, your consideration. One is that you 
"design-in" rump sessions like that--they won't 
be brought to these meetings which are well-defined 
and important. Line up a few people to talk about 
the problems . Another way might be to hol d a 
meeting in the places where the guys use these 
things and get out there and walk around--that was 
always an eye-opener to me--seeing the environ-
ment. Although, while people are polite to you, 
if you go in on a one-to-one basis you soon get 
the feeling that you're not trusted which either 
turns you off and you leave the f i eld entirely, or 
you say I'm going to beat this problem and I'm 
going to work with these guys . That' s the sort 
of thing that gives you such great stimulati~n 
with regard to continuing your work ~nd I th1nk 
that resources follow. It's one thing to put in 
front-end money to get a community going . It's 
another thing to sustain it, and I bel ieve the 
thing that will sustain ;tis constant ly getting 
involved witn those real problems and understanding 
your part in the overall scheme of things. That's 
why I tried to display that design system with the 
consideration of defects. 
I'd like to stop here because I'~ out of time 
anyway. Thank you. 
 DISCUSSION 
Larry DeVries (University of Utah): What was the outc~e of the cracked Minuteman story? 
F. Kelley (Air Force Materials Laboratory): That's such a fascinating story that it would have taken 
all morning to go into it. What we found out was that it was really a fail-safe thing and we could 
live with those cracks. The analysis which was done--the fracture mechanics analysis, which is kind 
of tricky on a vi~coelastic material, as Larry well knows--indicated that propagation of the crack 
would go longitudinally rather than radially and we did some over-testing in which we carved out 
four-inch-deep cracks in each of the star valleys and fired the motors and they fired normally. 
Our calculations showed that the cracks should not go more than an inch and a half deep; under 
the worst stress field they would grow longitudinally to the end of the motor. We over-cool ed the 
motor and split it, and it did indeed grow to the end. Therefore, what we have is essentially 
verification of the analysis that says you can live with those kinds of cracks. Now there have been 
other kinds of problems while dealing with unbonding about which you come to a different conclusion. 
K. Salama (University of Houston): I was glad to see that you mentioned training and education as parts 
of the progress of NDE. Do you know of any educational training programs on the university level? 
F. Kelley: let me say, honestly, that I don't know of any university program that purposely sets out 
to teach the subject. If there is, it's probably known to this crowd here. I know that there are 
kinds of training courses; maybe Don Forney could answer better than I. I think that you may or may 
not have been exposed to it. Dr. Burte and I did a survey of the science base in materials process-
ing over the past year to year and a half, and visited many, many campuses to talk about what we 
perceived as the real needs in terms of unsolved problems for the Air Force. Nondestructive 
evaluation was brought out as one of the most critical science needs. By implication or directly, 
in that environment one talks about what the educational program is doing for this need. If any 
of you have started a program in this area, I think it would be important to bring it out. We have 
a number of people from the universities represented here. Has anybody got one . . . there's one. 
(Speaker not identified): There are a number of survey courses, but the only degree program in NOT that 
I know of is at lowell Technological Institute; Steve Serabian's program. It goes to a Master's 
level. 
F. Kelley: Do you kn~ much about that course? 
(Speaker not identified): Other than that it's in the Mechanical Engineering Department, Lowell Tech-
nological Institute is in Lowell, Massachusetts, near Boston, and it uses all the NOT measurements . 
It seems to emphasize radiography and ultrasonics, but I have never taken the course. 
F. Kelley: I was wondering if anybody used a type of systems concept that integrates the measurement 
of flaws with the eventual decisions that must be made about them, and whether or not a course 
had been structured l ike that. 
(Speaker not identified): I know of a number of survey courses at RPI that are in de~lopment--having 
been given on a one-time basis--but I don't know of any formalized course of instruction such as 
you describe. There are several two-year schools that do this kind of thing, but they are more or 
less aimed at generating specialists and technicians. An example is Hutcheson Vocational Institute 
in Hutcheson, Minnesota. 
F. Kelley: It might be useful to get someone who is attending one of the sessions for teaching those 
courses to describe them. 
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